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Judging Judicial Appointment

Procedures
S.I. Strong*
ABSTRACT

Over

the

last

several

years,

judicial appointment

procedures in the United States have become increasingly
intractable. Members of both parties are seen to engage in
political gamesmanship, calling the legitimacy of the
appointment process into question and decreasing public

confidence in both the legislature and the judiciary. Questions
are even beginning to arise about whether and to what extent
the United States is complying with the rule of law.
Although numerous solutions have been proposed, one
alternative has not yet been considered: international law. As
paradoxicalas it may seem, the best and perhaps only feasible
solution to quintessentially domestic concerns about the
appointment of judges may require parties to go outside the
national legal system itself.

This Article takes its inspirationfrom the recent decision of
the European Court of Human Rights in Case of Gudmundur
Andri Astradsson v. Iceland and applies certain principles and
practices reflected in that case to the United States via the
American Convention on Human Rights. In so doing, the

analysis offers a useful and tangible means of addressing
improprieties associated with the appointment of judges in the

United States, thereby providing a new perspective on a very
importantproblem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although concerns have long been raised in the United States
about the politicization of judicial appointment procedures, the
situation has become untenable in the last few years. 1 For example,
in 2016, the Republican-led Senate refused to even hold hearings to
consider Judge Merrick Garland's nomination to the U.S. Supreme
Court, a move that has been called "unprecedented," 2 while in 2018,
the same body proceeded to both hear and confirm the nomination of
Judge Brett Kavanaugh, despite significant concerns enunciated by
numerous individuals and institutions, including the American Bar
3
Association, about his honesty, temperament, and ability to be fair.
In 2019, beleaguered Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was
poised to move forward with his so-called nuclear option to change
Senate rules to speed up confirmation of judicial appointees from a

1.
See Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent us. Silence and Dissent? The
ContrastingRoles of the Legislature in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L.
REV. 451, 470 (2011); Eric Hamilton, Politicizing the Supreme Court, 65 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 35, 35 (2012); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2168, 2183-99 (2006).
Such delays have occurred in the past, but in very different social and
2.
political circumstances, leading commentators to agree that the 2016 action was an
unprecedented violation of the Senate's procedural norms. See Erick Trickey, The
History of

"Stolen" Supreme

Court Seats,

SMITHSONIAN

MAG.

(Mar.

20,

2017),

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/history-stolen-supreme-court-seats180962589/ [https://perma.cc/B48U-KY9Q] (archived Nov. 9, 2019).
See Adam Liptak, Bar Association Questioned Kavanaugh's Temperament
3.
and
Honesty
in
2006,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
2,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/us/politics/kavanaugh-bar-association-aba.html
[https://perma.cc/V4TT-2W2Y] (archived Nov. 9, 2019); The Latest: ABA Urges Senate
to Slow Down on Kavanaugh Votes, ASSOcIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/203cde2444124d6d92504c3a81686fa1 [https://perma.cc/K2Y9VM3P] (archived Nov. 9, 2019).
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president of his own party, 4 mirroring efforts undertaken in 2013 by
then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to facilitate confirmation of
judicial nominees from President Obama. 5

Though some individuals believe these and similar actions to be
both proper and necessary, this type of behavior threatens democratic
values in the United States by reducing respect for Congress and
casting shadows on the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary.6 Not only have numerous studies shown that public
perception of the legitimacy of the courts decreases as politicization of
the judicial appointment process increases, 7 but indiscretions in
judicial appointment procedures also raise serious questions about
whether and to what extent the United States is continuing to adhere
to the rule of law. 8
Up until recently, the only possible responses to improprieties in
the judicial appointment process appeared to be political in nature, a
somewhat unsatisfying option given that the problems themselves
stem from political gamesmanship. 9 However, the recent decision of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Case of
Gudmundur Andri Astrddsson v. Iceland, Application no. 26374/18
(Astrddsson), provides useful and tangible proposals into 'how
concerns relating to the appointment of federal judges in the United
States might be addressed through an entirely new approach:
international law. 10

4.
See Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell Preps New Nuclear
Option
to
Speed
Trump
Judges,
POLITICO
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/trump-mcconnell-judges-1205722
[https://perma.cc/YR2A-TU2B] (archived Nov. 9, 2019).
5.
See Michael S. Greve, Bloc Party Federalism, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
279, 300 (2019).
6.
See Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from
Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1629-30 (2010).
7.
See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why
It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1276 (2008).
8.
See Wardlaw, supra note 6, at 1630.
9.
Numerous politically-based solutions have been proposed. See David R.
Stras, Understandingthe New Politics of JudicialAppointments, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1033,
1033 (2008) (reviewing various proposals contained in BENJAMIN WITTES,
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006), and
JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007)); Michael Teter,

Rethinking Consent: Proposals for Reforming the Judicial Confirmation Process, 73
OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 303 (2012) (proposing a fast-track approach); Clark, supra note 1, at
480-83 (looking to an English model); Nash, supra note 1, at 2200-05 (looking to
judicial elections).
10.
See Gudmundur Andri Astradsson v. Iceland, App. No. 26374/18, HUDOC
(2019), https-/hudoc.echr.coe.int
[httpsJ/perma.ec/345T-SGPY] (archived Feb. 14,
2020). The judgment is final as of March 12, 2019, but may be subject to editorial
revision. The matter was referred to the Grand Chamber on September 9, 2019,
although that does not affect the analysis herein. See id.
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The Article begins in Part II with a short discussion of the legal
backdrop to the Astrddsson case before continuing to Astrddsson itself
in Part III. The analysis then considers in Part IV whether the
1
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention)'
triggers duties similar to those established by the ECtHR in
Astrddsson under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
2
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention).1 The Article
combines these various strands of thought in Part V to determine
whether and to what extent the lessons of Astrddsson can and should
be applied to US judicial selection procedures before concluding in
Part VI with a number of forward-looking proposals.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that this Article does
not intend to identify specific individuals whose appointment
procedures can or should be challenged. Instead, the focus here is on
proposing a means of remedying egregious breaches of national and
international law.

II. LEGAL BACKDROP TO ASTRADSSON: ACTIONS IN AND INVOLVING
ICELANDIC NATIONAL COURTS

The events underlying the Astrddsson case date back to 2016,

when

Iceland

adopted

Judiciary

Act

No.

50/2016

(2016 Act),

establishing a new Court of Appeal and the method by which fifteen
3
judges were to be appointed initially to that court.1 According to the
2016 Act, a committee of experts (Committee) was to assess
candidates and deliver a report to the Minister of Justice (Minister),
who was not permitted to appoint any candidate who was not
4
considered "most qualified" by the Committee.1 The one exception to
the "most qualified" rule required Althingi (Parliament) to accept an
alternative proposal from the Minister was if the candidate in
question fulfilled the minimum requirements laid down by domestic
law.1 5 Once Parliament approved the candidates, the names were to
be sent to the President of Iceland to be formally appointed.16
After considering the credentials of various individuals who had
applied for positions on the new Court of Appeal, the Committee
provided the Minister with the list of the fifteen most qualified

See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
11.
123 [hereinafter American Convention].
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
12.
Freedoms, as amended by protocols nos. 11 & 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention].
13.
Astrddsson, ¶ 5.
14.
Id. ¶ 6.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
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candidates.1 7 Upon the Minister's request, the Committee
subsequently provided a ranked list of all thirty-three candidates.18
Ultimately, the Minister submitted fifteen names to the Parliament
for approval, but included four judges who were not among the
Committee's top fifteen.19

The fifteen candidates submitted by the Minister were approved
by a majority of the Constitutional and Supervisory Committee of
Parliament. 2 0 The vote was split along party lines, 2 1 with members of
the minority party "express[ing] serious reservations regarding the
Minister's compliance with principles of administrative law, including
the requirement of sufficient investigation and the rule of national

law that only the most qualified candidates should be selected." 2 2 The
next day, the full Parliament approved the fifteen candidates
submitted by the Minister, with the vote again splitting along party
lines. 23 Although the President of Iceland initially questioned the

legality of the process in Parliament, he subsequently appointed the
fifteen candidates put forward by the Minister and approved by
Parliament. 24
Immediately after the appointments were made by the
President, two of the candidates who were on the Committee's list of

fifteen but not on the list forwarded by the Minister to Parliament
(J.R.J. and A.H.) brought an action in Iceland's national courts. 25 The
matter went up to the Supreme Court of Iceland on two occasions. 26

Although the candidates asked for the appointments of the Minister's
fifteen individuals to be annulled, the Supreme Court did not grant
their request but did allow J.R.J. and A.H. to bring an action for

damages. 2 7
In its judgments, the Supreme Court of Iceland held that the
Minister had violated various provisions of national law regarding
the appointment of judges to the new Court of Appeal. 2 8 The Supreme
Court also indicated the critical need to uphold laws relating to
judicial selection, since those provisions do not involve the

17.
Id. 1¶ 7-8.
18.
Id. ¶ 7, 11-13.
19.
Id. ¶ 16.
20.
Id. ¶ 20.
21.
Id. ¶ 19.
22.
Id. ¶ 20.
23. Additional questions arose regarding the propriety of this vote. See id. ¶ 24.
24.
Id. ¶ 25.
25.
Id. 1 27.
26. Id. ¶¶ 29-35 (noting that the first Supreme Court decision addressed the
question of the type of relief (if any) that was warranted while the second considered
the question of the quantum and type of damages allowed).
27. Id. 11 29, 35. Of course, if any breach of proper appointment procedures
could be addressed merely through an award of damages, states would have little or no
incentive to abide by their own rules, so long as the cost of paying for the breach was
less than the benefit associated with improper appointment.
28.
Id. ¶¶ 32-34.
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appointment of "persons to offices that are accountable

to the

Minister, but rather members of another branch of government which
has a monitoring role vis-A-vis the other branches and is guaranteed
29
Ultimately, J.R.J. and
independence" under Iceland's Constitution.
A.H. were each granted ISK 700,000 (approximately £5,700) as
30
compensation for nonpecuniary damages.
Following the initial actions by J.R.J. and A.H., the two other
candidates who were on the Committee's list but who were not on the
Minister's list brought actions of their own for similar claims.31 Those
matters were still pending on appeal at the time the ECtHR handed
down its decision in Astrddsson in March 2019.32

III. ASTRADSSON ITSELF: THE ACTION IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

Astridsson-the
Andri
Gudmundur
involving
Incidents
applicant who initiated the case heard by the ECtHR-arose in
2017.33 After Astridsson was convicted in Icelandic national court for
driving without a valid driver's license and under the influence of
narcotics, he appealed the decision to the new Court of Appeal. 34 The

panel that was set to hear the matter included one of the judges
(A.E.) who had not appeared on the Committee's initial list of fifteen
35
candidates.

Before the matter was heard, Astradsson's counsel submitted a
request asking for A.E. to withdraw from the panel, based on the
claim that A.E.'s presence would deny Astradsson a fair trial
conducted by an impartial and independent tribunal established by
law. 36 When making the request, Astridsson's counsel relied on
Articles 59 and 70(1) of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6(1) of
the European Convention, in addition to various provisions of

national law. 37 The Court of Appeal rejected the request, and
Astradsson brought the matter to the Supreme Court of Iceland. 3 8
The Supreme Court indicated that the matter was untimely but did

29.
Id. ¶ 32.
30.
Id. ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 52.
31.
Id. ¶ 54.
32.
Id. ¶ 37.
33.
34.
Id. ¶¶ 37-39.
35.
Id. ¶¶ 40.
Id. ¶¶ 41-42.
36.
See European Convention, supra note 12, art. 6(1); Astrddsson, ¶ 42; see
37.
infra notes 42, 69 and accompanying text (quoting relevant language from the Icelandic
Constitution and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).
Astrddsson, 1$ 43-44.
38.
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agree to hear the matter if Astradsson's action in the Court of Appeal
failed, which it subsequently did. 3 9
When Astridsson brought his second application to the Supreme
Court,

he

included

a

number

of additional

allegations

about

improprieties associated with the appointment of A.E.4 0 Chief among
these was the fact that her husband had given up a preferential
position on the party's constituency list in favor of the Minister after
the Minister decided to include A.E. among the fifteen candidates
whose names were forwarded to Parliament, thereby doing "the
Minister 'a huge political favour' which had secured her political
future."4 1

When

the

Supreme

Court

of Iceland

refused

to

overturn

Astridsson's conviction, Astridsson brought his case to the ECtHR,
claiming a violation of both national and international law. 4 2 When
evaluating Astridsson's allegations, the ECtHR considered Article 59
of the Icelandic Constitution, which states that "[t]he organization of
the judiciary can only be established by law," and Article 70(1) of the
Constitution, which indicates, in part, that "[e]veryone shall, for the
determination of his rights and obligations or in the event of criminal
charge against him, be entitled, following a fair trial and within a
reasonable time, to the resolution of an independent and impartial
court of law."4 3 The ECtHR also considered "the unwritten rule ofIcelandic law that administrative authorities should appoint the most
competent candidate," a principle that had been reaffirmed in the
Supreme Court of Iceland's judgments involving Astridsson,4 4 and
gave "significant weight" to matters discussed by the Supreme Court
of Iceland in cases brought by J.R.J. and A.H. 4 5 The ECtHR also
relied heavily on Article 6(1) of the European Convention, which

states, "[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
impartial tribunal established by law." 46
Although the United States does not tie the concept of a fair
to judicial appointment procedures in the precisely same way

and
and
trial
that

Iceland does, there are some analogies to be found. For example,
Article 59 of the Iceland Constitution can be compared to Article II,

39. Id. ¶ 44-48.
40. Id. ¶ 76; see also id. 1 49.
41. Id. ¶ 76; see also id. 1 49.
42. The ECtHR also considered a number of relevant statutory and regulatory
provisions, including Section 4a of Iceland's Judiciary Act No. 15/1998 as well as
Sections 21 and IV of the Judiciary Act No. 50/2016. See id. ¶¶ 56-64.
43. Astrddsson, ¶ 55 (quoting STJ6RNARSKRA LYDVELDISINS
ISLANDS
[CONSTITUTION] June 17, 1944, arts. 59, 70(1) (Ice.)).
44. Astrdadsson, ¶ 78.
45. Id. 11 79, 107.
46. Id. 1 82; see also European Convention, supranote 12, at art. 6(1).
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Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, which indicates that "[t]he
President . . . by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
appoint . . . judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided
47
for, and which shall be established by law." Article 70 of the Iceland
Constitution is somewhat similar to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, which indicates that "[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
48
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Furthermore, the United States has a significant number of Senate
and Senate Judicial Committee rules affecting judicial selection
procedures as well as a variety of unwritten but potentially
enforceable norms associated with judicial appointments that not
only resemble similar aspects of Icelandic law but that would appear
to establish sufficiently distinct standards against which to assess a
49
cause of action for breach of those principles.

Finally, the United States is subject to various provisions of
international law that are very similar to those applicable to Iceland.
Critically, Article 8(1) of the American Convention contains language
very similar to Article 6(1) of the European Convention, indicating

that
[e]very person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a
criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and
50
obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.

Similarities between US and Icelandic constitutional, statutory,

and treaty-based provisions bode well for applying the lessons of

U.S. CONST., art. II, §2.
47.
Id. at amend. V. The due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
48.
might give rise to interesting questions about the propriety of elected state court
judges, but that issue is beyond the scope of the current Article. See id. at amend. XIV.
See Astrddsson, ¶¶ 55, 78; MATTHEW MCGOWAN, SENATE MANUAL
49.
CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1-113 (2014) [hereinafter SENATE
THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:
MANUAL]; AKHIL REED AKMAR, AMERICA'S
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY ix (2012); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution

Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 411-12 (2007) (arguing for unwritten
constitutional principles in the United States based on analogies to principles and
practices relating to England's unwritten constitution); Committee on Rules and
Administration, Rules of Procedure Unites States Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
SENATE (2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/rules [https://perma.cc/W4S895M7] (archived Nov. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Senate Rules]; Clark, supra note 1, at 46770 (describing unwritten norms regarding judicial appointments utilized by the Senate
since the adoption of the Constitution); Trickey, supra note 2 (noting recent violations
of unwritten norms in judicial appointment procedures); see also supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text (citing relevant aspects of the U.S. Constitution).
American Convention, supra note 11, art. 8(1); see also European
50.
Convention, supranote 12, at art. 6(1).
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Astrddsson to the United States. 51 However, it is possible to conduct
an even more nuanced analysis by considering the ECtHR's
discussion of European case law and authorities. These references
can be analyzed pursuant to three separate criteria: procedure,
substance, and structure.
A. ProceduralConsiderations
In Astrddsson, the ECtHR considered a number of procedural
issues that provide courts and commentators with a useful framework
for analyzing the propriety of judicial selection procedures. In so
doing, the ECtHR relied on a rich array of binding and persuasive
authority developed by European bodies considering challenges to
judicial appointments.

The ECtHR began by citing the Judgment of the General Court
of the European Union (General Court) in Case No. T-639/16 P,
another case involving flawed judicial appointment procedures, to
support the notion that claims relating to irregularities in the
composition of a judicial panel trigger fundamental questions of
public policy. 52 According to this decision, courts, particularly those at

the

appellate

level,

must

address

issues

relating

to judicial

appointment sua sponte if the parties do not raise the question
themselves. 5 3 If the United States were to follow this approach,
courts would not only be permitted but required to insert themselves
into the judicial selection process. While US courts are currently

loath to undertake this type of analysis due to concerns about the
separation of powers, 54 it is possible to read this duty as reinforcing,
rather than undermining, a constitutional system of checks and
balances. 55

51.
Other constitutional provisions might also be relevant to such a suit,
although it is unnecessary to consider those possibilities here. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. I (concerning the right to petition the government for redress of grievances);
U.S. CONST amend. VI (concerning speedy and public trials in criminal matters); U.S.
CONST amend. IX (concerning unenumerated rights retained by the people); U.S.
CONST amend. XIV (concerning equal protection under the law and raising questions
about selection of state court judges).
52.
Case T-639/16 P, FV v. Council, ¶ 66, EU:T:2018:22 (2018); Astrddsson, ¶
67; see also Marco Borraccetti, Fair Trial, Due Process and Rights of Defense in the EU
Legal Order, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: FROM DECLARATION TO
BINDING INSTRUMENT 95, 96 (Giacomo di Federico ed., 2011) (discussing the
relationship between the jurisprudence of EU courts and the European Court of
Human Rights).
53. See Astrddsson, ¶ 69 (quoting FV, ¶ 66).
54. See McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Idaho 1981).
55. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 72324, 771-72 (2012) (discussing the purpose and effects of constitutional separation of
powers); see also infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (regarding structural
concerns).
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Another important element of Astrddsson involves the ECtHR's
determination that, because "a violation by a tribunal of domestic
legal provisions relating to the establishment and competence of
judicial organs gives rise to a violation of Article 6§1" of the European

Convention, the court need not undertake "a separate examination of
whether the breach of the principle that a tribunal be established by

5 6 Instead, the focus is solely on the
law rendered a trial unfair."
57
This technique is
propriety of the appointment procedure itself.
particularly useful because it shifts the inquiry away from the
fairness of the individual proceeding (which is usually addressed
through the appellate procedure) and back to the allegedly improper
appointment, thereby underscoring the systemic (rather than
individual) nature of the legal injury.5 8
Finally, Astrddsson considers important questions about the
magnitude of the impropriety as part of its discussion of the principle
of subsidiarity. According to longstanding principles of European law,
the ECtHR must give national courts a margin of appreciation on
certain matters and cannot question their interpretation of national
59
law "unless there has been a flagrant violation of domestic law."
Interestingly, this standard has also been recognized in US courts in

cases involving the selection of state court judges. 60 In Astrddsson,

the ECtHR extended this test to instances "where, as in the present
case, the breach is attributable to another branch of Government and
6
has been acknowledged by the domestic courts." 1

According to the ECtHR, a "flagrant" violation of national law
involves "only those breaches of applicable national rules in the
establishment of a tribunal that are of a fundamental nature, and
form an integral part of the establishment and functioning of the
judicial system."6 2 Furthermore, when considering whether a
"flagrant" violation of national law exists, "the Court will take into
account whether the facts before it demonstrate that a breach of the
domestic rules on the appointment of judges was deliberate or, at a
63
minimum, constituted a manifest disregard of the national law."
While this test arises out of European law, it may prove useful to
courts in other jurisdictions, particularly with respect to the
structural issues involving the relationship between the different

Astrddsson, ¶ 100 (citation omitted).
56.
57.
See id.
This may assist with standing issues. See infra notes 135-36 and
58.
accompanying text.
59.
Astrddsson, ¶ 100.
Cf. Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-cv-00136-JWS, 2009 WL 10695976, at *8-9
60.
(D. Ala. Sept. 15, 2009) (noting those who voted in judicial elections may challenge an
appointment under Alaskan state law if the state acts in an arbitrary, capricious, or
invidious manner in devising an appointment plan).
Astrddsson, ¶ 101.
61.
Id. ¶ 102 (citation omitted).
62.
63.
Id.
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branches of government. 64 In particular, this feature may assist US
courts in overcoming real or perceived obstacles associated with the
political question doctrine. 6 5
B. Substantive Considerations
The ECtHR decision in Astrddsson also addressed a number of

substantive considerations. Interestingly, many of the court's
observations aligned closely with contemporary scholarship about the
connection between judicial appointment procedures, on the one
hand, and judicial independence and legitimacy, on the other. 66
When analyzing this issue, the ECtHR drew on a variety of
European authorities. For example, the ECtHR noted that, when
considering the legality of the appointment of one of its judges in
Case E-21/16, the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade

[a]ny assessment of the lawfulness of the Court's composition, particularly
concerning its independence and impartiality, requires that due account is
taken of several important factors. First, the principle of judicial independence
is one of the fundamental values of the administration of justice. . . . Second, it
is vital not only that judges are independent and fair, they must also appear to
be so. Third, maintaining judicial independence requires that the relevant rules
for judicial appointment . . . must be strictly observed. Any other approach
could lead to the erosion of public confidence in the Court and thereby
undermine its appearance of independence and impartiality. 6 8

.

Association (EFTA) 6 7 held that

e

{

The ECtHR also cited Case No. T-639/16 P from the General

Court, which noted that "one of the requirements concerning the
composition of the Chamber is that courts must be independent,

64.
See infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (regarding structural
concerns).
65.
See id. (regarding structural concerns).
66.
See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Creating A Judicial Appointments Commission:
Which Model Works Best?, 1 PUB. L. 102, 118 (2004); Daphna Renan, Presidential
Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2281 (2018). Notably, a number of
European jurisdictions have adopted these norms as reflective of "best practices." See
Anne Sanders & Luc von Danwitz, Selecting Judges in Poland and Germany:
Challenges to the Rule of Law in Europe and Propositions for a New Approach to
JudicialLegitimacy, 19 GERMAN L.J. 769, 812-13 (2018); Clark, supra note 1, at 480.
67. The Court of Justice of the EFTA addresses matters involving Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway, which are members of both EFTA and the European
Economic Area. See EFTA COURT, http/sJ/www.efta.int/eea/eea-institutions/efta-court
(last visited Feb. 14, 2020) [https://perma.ccBUP6-Q2HY] (archived Feb. 14, 2020).
68.
Astrddsson, 1 65; see also Case E-21/16, Pascal Nobile v. DAS RechtsschutzVerscherungs, Decision, EFTA Court, ¶ 16 (Feb. 14, 2017); Carl Baudenbacher, The
EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353,
386-87 (2005) (discussing the relationship between the Court of Justice of the
European Free Trade Association and the European Court of Human Rights).
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69
as reflected in Article
impartial and previously established by law,"
70
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The ECtHR also cited its own extensive case law under Article 6(1) of
the European Convention,7 1 indicating not only that the concept of
the "lawful judge" was inextricably tied to the notion of the rule of
law, but also recognizing the connection between the principle of the
lawfully appointed judge and judicial independence from the
executive branch. 72 Under this line of jurisprudence, "the composition
of the court and its jurisdiction must be regulated beforehand by legal
provisions" 73 and those procedures "must be strictly adhered to" if the
litigants and the public are to retain their confidence in the
judiciary. 7 4 Furthermore, according to the General Court, "it is not
only essential that judges are independent and impartial, but also
75
All of
that the procedure for their appointment appears to be so."
these principles are relevant to the consideration of recent US
76
practices involving judicial appointments.

69.
Astrddsson, ¶ 69 (quoting Case T-639/16 P, FV v. Council, ¶ 67,
EU:T:2018:22 (2018)).
Article 47 indicates, in relevant part, that "[e]veryone whose rights and
70.
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective
remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law." Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1 [hereinafter
Charter of Fundamental Rights].
European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 6(1); see also Astrddsson, ¶ 72.
71.
Although the jurisprudence of the ECtHR varies somewhat between the criminal and
civil limbs of Article 6(1), the parties in this case agreed that the criminal limb applied.
See id. 1 96; see also Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights:
Civil

Limb,

EUROPEAN

COURT

OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS

(2019),

[https://perma.cc/N7BMhttp://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf
552D] (archived Feb. 14, 2020) [hereinafter ECtHR, Civil Limb Guide]; Guide on
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Criminal Limb, EUROPEAN
COURT

OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS

(2019),

http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/GuideArt-6_criminal ENG.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/MV3R-B83B] (archived Feb. 14, 2020) [hereinafter ECtHR, Criminal
Limb Guide].
72. Astrddsson, ¶ 75 (quoting id. 11 68, 72). When discussing Article 6(1) of the
European Convention, the ECtHR noted that: "[T]he requirement that a tribunal be
established by law is closely connected to the other general requirements of Article 6§1,
on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, both also being an integral part
of the fundamental principle of the rule of law in a democratic society. In short, 'what is
at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the
public."' Id. 1 99.
Astrddsson, ¶ 69 (quoting FV, ¶ 68).
73.
Id. 1 69 (citing FV, 11 74-75).
74.
75. Id.
76.
See infra notes 126-47 and accompanying text.
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C. Structural Considerations
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Astrddsson for US
audiences is the discussion of structural issues, meaning the proper

roles of different branches of government in the appointment of
judges. 77 Indeed, the United States has struggled with these matters
in the past. 78 In Astrddsson, the ECtHR relied heavily on materials
generated by the Council of Europe, including Opinion No. 18/2015

(Opinion), which discussed the relationship and position of the
judiciary with respect to other state entities in modern democracies. 79
After recognizing the connection between the judicial power and the
rule of law, 80 the Opinion recognized that "appointment by vote of

Parliament and, to a lesser degree, by the executive can be seen to
give . . . democratic legitimacy" to the judiciary, in contrast to
"constitutional or formal legitimacy," which is conferred by
compliance with the mechanisms set forth in the constitution and
other national laws. 8 1 However, the Opinion highlighted the "risk of
politicization" that arises when the legislative and executive branches
are involved in judicial appointment processes. 82
The solution, according to the ECtHR, could be found in
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe (Recommendation), which suggested that "[t]he

authority taking decisions on the selection and career of judges
should be independent of the executive and legislative powers."8 3 In
contrast to the approach adopted by Iceland and other countries
(including the United States), the ECtHR took the view that
"[d]ecisions concerning the selection and career of judges should be
based on objective criteria pre-established by law or by the competent

authorities. Such decisions should be based on merit, having regard
to the qualifications, skills and capacity required to adjudicate cases
by applying the law while respecting human dignity." 84

77.
See Chafetz, supra note 55, at 723-24, 771-72.
78.
See McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Idaho 1981); Renan, supra
note 66, at 2281.
79.
See generally Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 18 on
the Position of the Judiciary and Its Relation With the Other Powers of State in a
Modern
Democracy
(Oct.
16,
2015),
https://rm.coe.int/16807481a1
[https://perma.cc/3463-SYG7] (archived Feb. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Judges' Opinion];
see also Astrddsson, ¶ 70.
80.
Astrddsson, ¶ 70 (quoting Judges' Opinion, supra note 79, ¶ 13).
81.
Id. (quoting Judges' Opinion, supra note 79, ¶ 15).
82.
Judges' Opinion, supra note 79, ¶ 15.
83.
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2010)12, Judges: independence, efficiency, and responsibility (adopted Nov. 17,
2010), ¶ 46, https://rm.coe.int/16807096c1 [httpsJ/perma.cc/QG9S-WUC8] (archived
Feb. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Recommendation].
84.
See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2 (setting forth the Senate's power to provide
"advice and consent" regarding appointment of federal judges in the United States);
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The concept of merit-based appointments is not in any way
foreign to the United States, but has instead been discussed for
has not typically been
this conversation
years. 85 However,
undertaken in the context of international human rights obligations,

as posited by this Article.
When contemplating these issues, the ECtHR recognized the

need to respect the separation of powers, particularly between the
executive and the judiciary, but also highlighted the fundamental
86
As a result, the
need to protect the independence of the judiciary.

ECtHR held that it
must look behind appearances and ascertain whether a breach of the applicable
national rules on the appointment of judges created a real risk that the other
organs of Government, in particular the executive, exercised undue discretion
undermining the integrity of the appointment process to an extent not
envisaged by the national rules in force at the material time.87

After setting forth the applicable legal standard, the ECtHR
then applied the various principles to the case of Astrddsson, holding
that the process by which A.E. was appointed "amounted to a flagrant
breach of the applicable rules at the material time" and failed to
"secure an adequate balance between the executive and legislative
branches in the appointment process," as contemplated by preexisting
rules and norms, including those that were unwritten but
88
Furthermore, the actions were taken
nevertheless well established.
rules," creating a process that
applicable
the
of
disregard
"in manifest
that the judiciary in a
confidence
the
of
detriment
the
was "to
and contravened the
public
the
in
inspire
must
society
democratic
very essence of the principle that a tribunal must be established by
89
law, one of the fundamental principles of the rule of law." In so
holding, the ECtHR "emphasise[d] that a contrary finding . . . would
be tantamount to holding that this fundamental guarantee provided
by Article 6§1 of the [European] Convention would be devoid of
meaningful protection. Therefore, the Court conclude[d] that there
90
has been a violation of Article 6§1 in the present case."
Astrddsson, J¶ 6, 57, 58, 71 (outlining the process in Iceland) (quoting
Recommendation, supra note 83, ¶ 44).
See Lauren C. Bell, Federal Judicial Selection in History and Scholarship,
85.
96 JUDICATURE 296, 301-03 (2013) (discussing merit selection in the federal judicial
appointment process); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 Mo. L.
REV. 675, 675 (2009) (discussing merit selection in state-level judicial appointment
processes, often referred to as the "Missouri Plan").
Astrddsson, ¶ 103 (citations omitted).
86.
Id.
87.
Id. ¶ 123; see also id. ¶¶ 113-19 (providing five reasons why the
88.
Government's arguments were not adopted). Two of the seven judges of the ECtHR
dissented from the outcome, although they agreed in the admissibility of the action. See
id. ¶ 135.
Id. ¶ 123.
89.
Id.
90.
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Although the ECtHR held that Iceland had violated Article 6(1)
of the European Convention, the Court did not indicate how Iceland
should remedy that situation. 91 Instead, "it is for the respondent
State to choose . . . the general and/or, if appropriate, individual
measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to

the violation or violations found by the Court and to redress as far as
possible the effects." 92 In other words, although the ECtHR clearly
approved of the merits-based system of judicial appointment outlined

in the Recommendation, the ECtHR did not go so far as to mandate
that approach. 93
D. Implications for EuropeanParties
Although

the

ECtHR

and

other

European

courts

have

adjudicated a range of matters dealing with the appointment of
judges in the past, Astrddsson provides a number of new insights that
are important to parties subject to the European Convention. 94 For
example, this decision adds to the already impressive understanding
of the concept of a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the European
Convention and underscores the fact that fairness relates not only to

the procedures used in a particular trial but also to the legitimacy of
the tribunal and the individual decision-makers. 95 In this context, the
concept of legitimacy includes both democratic and constitutional
elements and is directly linked to the concept of the rule of law. 96
Furthermore, Astrcddsson demonstrates that suits seeking to enforce
judicial appointment procedures can be brought not only by judges
and judicial candidates who have been directly affected by improper
appointment mechanisms but also by individual litigants whose

matters are to be heard by improperly appointed judges.

This

approach reinforces the idea that violations of established
appointment procedures do more than injure individual judges;

91.
See id. 1 131. Astridsson was awarded 65,000 in non-pecuniary damages.
See id. ¶ 128.
92.
Id. T 131.
93.
Id. ¶ 71 (quoting Recommendation, supra note 83, ¶ 44).
94.
The European Convention applies to nations who are members of the
Council of Europe. See European Convention, supra note 12, at pblm. ("The
governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe .... ").
95.
See European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 6(1); ECtHR Civil Limb
Guide, supra note 71; ECtHR Criminal Limb Guide, supranote 71.
96.
Legitimacy can be defined in a variety of ways, as can the rule of law. See
Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention Elections, the Rule of Law, and the Rhetorical
Weakness of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 112-19 (2012) (discussing various
features of the rule of law in the context of judicial selection); S.I. Strong, Truth in a
Post-Truth Society: How Sticky Defaults, Status Quo Bias and the Sovereign
PrerogativeInfluence the Perceived Legitimacy of InternationalArbitration, 2018 U.
ILL. L. REV. 533, 542-48 (2018) (describing common concepts of legitimacy in dispute
resolution).
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instead, the damage is systemic, suggesting a broad public interest in
judicial appointments. 97
The pervasive importance of judicial legitimacy justifies an
equally expansive means of enforcing the relevant norms. Allowing
an individual litigant to challenge the appointment of a particular
judge, as was the case in Astrddsson, is particularly effective, since a
judicial candidate who is improperly overlooked for a position may
not want to bring suit lest that ruin his or her future chances for
advancement.
Astrddsson also assists European parties by illuminating certain
structural issues not only between the European Convention and
national law but also between different branches of government in
democratic societies. To some extent, the ECtHR is in a difficult

position, both practically and philosophically, because it is somewhat
removed from the unique constitutional and political issues that
motivate a particular country. However, that type of distance also
provides the ECtHR with opportunities that might not otherwise
exist. For example, being one step removed from Iceland's domestic

dilemma allowed the ECtHR to rise above partisan politics to set
forth

certain

fundamental

expectations

about

how

judges

in

democratic states are to be appointed. As a result, the ECtHR was
able to produce substantive guidelines that should be helpful to
nations that both are and are not subject to the European
Convention, while also demonstrating a potential detour around

domestic roadblocks to reform.

IV.

US OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS

Because Astrddsson was decided by the ECtHR, the decision does
not apply directly to judicial appointment proceedings in the United
States, since the United States is not a state party to the European
Convention. 98 However, the United States is a signatory of the
American Convention, which is similar to the European Convention
in several key regards, particularly with respect to the right to a fair
trial and respect for the rule of law. 99 The question therefore is
whether and to what extent a party can rely on an Astrddsson-style

97.
See Pettys, supra note 96, at 104-05 (noting broad public interest in
appointment of US federal judges).
98.
See Simplified Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUROPE
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/(2019),
/conventions/chartSignature/3 [https://perma.cc/J3UZ-NTG4] (archived Jan. 8, 2020);
see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99.
See American Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 8-9; European
Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 6-7; supranote 50 and accompanying text (quoting
art. 8(1) of the American Convention).
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analysis under the American Convention to challenge recent or future
actions involving judicial appointments in the United States.
The first issue to consider is whether an injured party-tither a
judge (like J.R.J. or A.H.) who was inappropriately passed over or a
private party (like Astrddsson) who had a criminal or civil matter
heard by a judge who was improperly appointed to the bench--could
rely on the American Convention in a domestic US proceeding. 100 At

this point, the answer is clearly no, since the United States has
signed but not yet ratified the American Convention, which means

that the instrument is not directly applicable in US courts. 101
However, even though it is unratified, the American Convention is
still binding on the United States as a matter of international law
pursuant to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Interpretation
of Treaties.1 02 Therefore, it may be possible to address concerns
relating to judicial appointment procedures in the United States
through one of the two enforcement mechanisms reflected in the

American Convention itself.1 03
The first process to consider involves the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (IACtHR), which may initially appear analogous to
the ECtHR.1 04 However, individuals may not bring a suit in their own
capacity in the IACtHR, as they can in the ECtHR.1 05 Instead, an

100. Se American Convention, supra note 11. Some commentators have
suggested litigation as a way out of the current dilemma regarding judicial
appointment procedures. See, e.g., Karl A. Schweitzer, Litigating the Appointments
Clause: The Most Effective Solution for Senate Obstructionof the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L 909, 923 (2010).
101. See Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 925-26 (7th Cir. 2001). However, some
US courts have cited the jurisprudence of the IACtHR with approval. See Han Kim v.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
102. According to Article 18, "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) It has signed the treaty or has
exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty; or (b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. See also David H. Moore, The President's UnconstitutionalTreatymaking,
59 UCLA L. REV. 598, 600-01 (2012); see also id. at 650-51 (citation omitted) (noting
that although some experts at one time considered the interstate obligation of states
that had not yet ratified a treaty to be moral rather than legal in nature, "the United
States has since emphasized 'that whatever doubt may have existed in the past, the
rule expressed in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention has become a legal obligation
binding upon all states."').
103. See American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 33.
104. See id. at art. 52.
105. See id. at art. 61(1). As a result, there are far fewer decisions from the
IACtHR than from the ECtHR. See Case Law Database, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng (listing over 54,000 decisions in total); Decision
and

Judgements,

INTER-AM.

COURT

OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

httpJ/www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_caso s_contencioso s.cfm?lang=en
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action in the IACtHR may only be brought by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (Commission) or a state party to the
American Convention. 106 Even more problematically, the failure of
the United States to ratify the American Convention means that the
United States is not subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
IACtHR.1 07 Instead, the IACtHR can only obtain jurisdiction over the
10 8
United States by special agreement.
Given the current US stance on human rights and the political
nature of the acts in question, it appears unlikely that the United
States would consent to the jurisdiction of the IACtHR in matters
involving appointment of domestic judges. Even if the United States
did provide the necessary consent, it is doubtful that the commission
or another state party would actually bring suit against the United
States in the IACtHR, since that would not be politically expedient,
particularly given the current administration's penchant for acts of
0 9
Indeed, the most likely response
personal and political retribution.1
to an action brought by the Commission or another state party
against the United States would be for the current administration to
reduce funding for the Organization of American States (OAS), the
body responsible for promulgating and giving effect to the American
Convention." 0 However, events over the last two years suggest that
the current administration will not limit itself to established norms of

[https-/perma.cc/J3RR-6TQT] (archived Nov. 18, 2019) (listing only 385 decisions in
total).
106. See American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 61(1).
107. See id. at art. 62(1) ("A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of
ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it
recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction
of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this
Convention.").

108. See id. at art. 62(3).
109. See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND.
L. REv. 777, 838 (2017).
110. The United States currently pays sixty percent of the organization's annual
budget. See Organization of American States, General Assembly AG/RES. 1 (LII-E/17),
Program-Budgetof the Organizationfor 2018, at 1 (Nov. 10, 2017) (adopting the scale
of quota assessments reflected in Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs,
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Doc. No. OEA/Ser.G
CP/CAAP-2673/03 rev. 1 (Feb. 25, 2005)). The current Administration has threatened
funding of other international organizations, most notably the United Nations. See
Laura Hillard & Amanda Shendruk, Funding the United Nations: What Impact Do
U.S. Contributions Have on UN Agencies and Programs?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what[https://perma.cc/L63Wimpact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs
R4ZA] (archived Nov. 18, 2019). The OAS is doubtless particularly cautious at this
time, given recent political attacks on the OAS from member states that are unhappy
with being investigated for human rights abuses. See Angel R. Oquendo, The
Politicization of Human Rights: Within the Inter-American System and Beyond, 50
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 1, 2 (2017).
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statecraft, which suggests states could face other types of punitive

action from the United States.'1 1

The second enforcement mechanism to consider involves the
Commission

itself.11 2 According

to Article

41 of the

American

Convention, the Commission is responsible for a variety of functions,
including the promotion of "respect for and defense of human rights"
by "develop[ing] an awareness of human rights among the peoples of
America," "mak[ing] recommendations to the governments

of the

member states, when it considers such action advisable, for the
adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the
framework of their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well
as appropriate measures to further the observance of those rights,"
and similar tasks.113
However, the Commission also has an investigative-adjudicative
function under Article 41(f), which indicates that the Commission
may "take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to
its authority under the provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this

Convention."11 4 Notably, the ability to lodge a petition relating to an
alleged violation of the American Convention by a state party is held
not only by nongovernmental organizations recognized in one or more
member states of the OAS but also by an individual or group of
individuals, which is very similar to the standing approach reflected
in Astrddsson.115
If the Commission finds that a violation of the American
Convention has occurred, it issues a merits report that
includes recommendations to the State, which may be designed to: bring an end
to the actions that violate human rights; clarify the facts and carry out an
investigation and punishment; make reparation for the damages caused;
introduce changes to the legal system; and/or require the adoption of other

111. The current Trump administration has a history of seeking political
retribution. See, e.g., Jessica Taylor & Sasha Ingber, Trump Threatens to Send
Detained Immigrants to 'Sanctuary Cities' as Retaliation, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 12,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/12/712760676/trump-threatens-to-send-detainedimmigrants-to-sanctuary-cities
[https://perma.cc/MXB3-88BQ]
(archived Nov. 18,
2019).
112. See American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 33.
113. Id. at art. 41.
114. Id. at art. 41(f).
115. See id. at art. 44; Gudmundur Andri Astrddsson v. Iceland, App. No.
26374/18, HUDOC (2019). Article 45 of the American Convention states that: "[a]ny
State Party may, when it deposits its instrument of ratification of or adherence to this
Convention, or at any later time, declare that it recognizes the competence of the
Commission to receive and examine communications in which a State Party alleges
that another State Party has committed a violation of a human right set forth in this
Convention." American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 45. Although the United
States has not made this latter declaration, it remains bound by the obligations set
forth in Article 41 and subject to the provisions described in Article 44. See id. at arts.
41, 44.
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measures or State actions to prevent similar violations from occurring in the
116
future.

Merits reports are typically provided only to the states parties
pursuant to the rule of confidentiality reflected in Article 50 of the
American Convention, although a limited number of reports are
subsequently published by the Commission pursuant to the procedure
described in Article 51.117 In either case, this remedy appears very
similar to that adopted in Astrddsson.118
Although it may seem unusual to bring a suit against the United

States in an international venue, there are numerous precedents.
Indeed, between 2014 and 2017, the Commission received 365
petitions regarding potential violations of the American Convention
by the United States and initiated 110 merits-based investigations
19
under Article 44 and associated provisions.1 During that same fouryear period, seven merits reports regarding the United States were
published.1 20 The most recent report involving the United States was

issued in March 2019 and discussed police violence against Black
individuals.121 This particular report is especially significant to the
current analysis, since the Commission found itself competent to
compile factual information and issue clear recommendations about
how the United States can and should proceed in the future despite
22
the highly politicized nature of the events in question.1
Although the Commission has not yet addressed issues involving
the selection and appointment of judges in the United States, it has
considered concerns regarding judicial appointments in other
countries. For example, in 2005, three Venezuelan judges filed a
complaint with the Commission alleging that Articles 8 (the right to a
fair trial), 23 (the right to participate in government), 24 (the right to
equal protection), 25 (the right to judicial protection), and 29(c) (other

116.

See Statistical Data on the Activities of the Inter-American Comission on

Human Rights, INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Dec.

http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/statistics/statistics.html
2016),
[https-/perma.cc/35K4-G3YY ] (archived Nov. 18, 2019) [hereinafter IACHR Statistics]
(this language appears under "Merits Report" within the glossary).
117. See American Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 50-51.
118. See Astrddsson, ¶ 72.
119. See IACHR Statistics, supra note 116 (select "United States"). The
Commission did not report on these types of proceedings prior to 2014. See id. (under
the glossary, see "Cases at the Merit Stage").
120. See id. (select "United States").
121. See IACHR Releases New Report on Police Violence Against Afrodescendants in the United States, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Mar. 18, 2019),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media-center/PReleases/2019/069.asp
[https://perma.cc/3WYM-7MPQ] (archived Nov. 18, 2019).
122. See Police Violence Against Afro-descendants in the United States, INTERAM.

COMM'N

ON

HUMAN

RIGHTS,

ORG.

OF

AM.

STATES

(Nov.

httpJ/www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/PoliceUseOfForceAfrosUSA.pdf
[https-/perma.cc/QX2J-6ENF] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).

26,

2018),

2020]

JUDGINGJUDICIALAPPOINTMENT PROCEDURES

635

rights inherent in human personality or deriving from democratic
norms) of the American Convention had been violated when the

Venezuelan government removed the judges from the bench after the
judges ruled against the government in several matters.1 23 These
types of claims are similar in certain key regards to those asserted by
J.R.J. and A.E. in Icelandic national courts as well as those asserted
by Astridsson at the national and international levels.12 4
Given
the willingness
of the
Commission
to
initiate
investigations involving the United States, even in politically
sensitive matters such as police misconduct, and the history of the
Commission in addressing matters involving judicial appointments in

other jurisdictions, it appears that the Commission could very well
decide that it has jurisdiction over alleged improprieties in US
judicial appointment procedures. Furthermore, fears of political or

other forms of retribution may be diminished if the Commission is
seen as simply responding to a request for investigation rather than
initiating a proceeding.1 2 5 However, the matter must first be brought
either by a nongovernmental organization recognized in an OAS
member state or an individual or group of individuals with an
interest in the actions under investigation. This latter issue is where

Astrddsson is most useful, as discussed in the following Part.

V. ASTRADSSON AND THE US EXPERIENCE: ANALOGIES AND ARGUMENTS

Although Astrddsson was rendered by the ECtHR, and not the
IACtHR or Commission, the decision nevertheless provides useful
guidance on how issues involving judicial appointments in the United
States might be addressed as a matter of international law.126 The
following analysis considers both procedural and substantive
concerns.
A. ProceduralMatters

Astrddsson offers important insights into a number of procedural
matters that might be relevant to a Commission investigation into
judicial appointments in the United States.1 27 First, the decision

123. See Cova v. Venezuela, Petition 282/04, Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Report No.
24/05 (2005) [hereinafter Cova Report]; Lauren Castaldi, Note, JudicialIndependence
Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the Complications of
Rule of Law Reform, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 477, 488-89 (2006).
124. See Gudmundur Andri Astridsson v. Iceland, App. No. 26374/18, ¶¶ 27-34,
41-54, 72, HUDOC (2019).
125. See supra notes 105, 113-14 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Astrddsson.
127. The case also suggests some interesting routes that may be available in
domestic courts, given the statement that courts can and should investigate problems
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indicates that concerns about judicial selection procedures can not

only be raised by a judge (as was the case when the Commission
considered potential violations of the American Convention by
Venezuela)1 28 but can also be raised by individuals who are scheduled
29
Astrddsson
to appear in front of improperly appointed judges.1
further suggests that the best tactical approach in cases brought by
private individuals may involve persons subject to criminal charges,
since procedural protections regarding criminal defendants tend to be
more robust and well-developed than similar protections in civil
matters. 130
Some aspects of Astrddsson may be more challenging. For
example, the decision suggests that an applicant may need to exhaust
domestic remedies before bringing a matter to the attention of the
Commission. 13 1 This type of requirement is standard practice in
international proceedings and is reflected in Articles 46 and 47 of the
American Convention, which discuss admissibility of petitions.132
However, Article 47 indicates that exhaustion of domestic remedies

may not be necessary if "the domestic legislation of the state
concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the
right or rights that have allegedly been violated" or "the party
alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies
33
under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them."1
This raises questions not only about whether the inapplicability of
the American Convention in domestic US courts would allow an
applicant to bypass the exhaustion requirement but also whether
courts' likely reliance on the political question doctrine-which serves
to bar review of certain politically sensitive acts before the matter
proceeds to a hearing on the substance of the dispute and provides

with judicial selection sua sponte as a matter of public policy. See id. 1 69; see also Case
No. T-639/16 P, FV v. Council, 1 66 EU:T:2018:22, (Jan. 25, 2018). While the American
Convention is not directly applicable in US courts, some courts consider the instrument
persuasive. See American Convention, supra note 11; Han Kim v. Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918,
925-26 (7th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, parties in US courts may also be able to build a
case based solely on US law. See Schweitzer, supra note 100, at 923; see also supra note
49 and accompanying text (noting possible violations of US law).
128. See Cova Report, supra note 123.
129. See Astrddsson, ¶ 72.
130. See S.I. Strong, General Principles of Procedural Law and Procedural Jus
Cogens, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 347, 357 (2018). However, the developing concept of
"procedural jus cogens," which would doubtless include the need to have a matter
adjudicated by a judge appointed in accordance with the rule of law, applies to civil as
well as criminal matters. See id.
131. See Astrddsson, ¶¶ 100-01; see also infra note 145 (noting possible means of
advancing a cause of action in US national courts).
132. Admissibility criteria for petitions to the Commission are outlined in
Articles 46 and 47 of the American Convention, with the relevant procedures described
in Articles 30-36. See American Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 30-36, 46-47; see
also European Convention, supra note 12, at art. 35(1).
133. American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 47.
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defendants with an absolute shield from review, regardless of the

strength of the plaintiff's claim-would render recourse to domestic
courts futile. 134
Standing requirements for challenges to judicial appointment
procedures in the United States may also make it difficult for a case
to proceed in US domestic court. 135 However, there have been
instances where an individual party (notably, a criminal defendant)
has been found to have standing to contest the appointment of a
judge who presided over that person's case.136 As a result, the
Commission may very well require an applicant to proceed through

the domestic process, even if it is unlikely that the US courts will ever
reach the merits of the claim, since that will minimize charges that
the Commission is overreaching itself should it deem an action
regarding US judicial appointment procedures admissible. 137
B. Substantive Matters

Astrddsson also offers useful guidance on various substantive
concerns. For example, regardless of whether an applicant must begin
in the national courts, persuasive arguments can be made, as per

134. Under the political question doctrine, US courts refuse to intervene in a
particular matter on the grounds that the issue is more appropriately decided by the
political branches of government. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507
(2019) (ruling partisan gerrymandering to be nonjusticiable); Garza v. Lappin, 253
F.3d 918, 925-26 (7th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962); Margit Cohn,
Form, Formula and Constitutional Ethos: The Political Question/Justiciability
Doctrine in Three Common Law Systems, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 677 (2011)
(discussing the effect of the application of the political question doctrine); John
Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REv. 457, 459 (2017); Teter,
supranote 9, at 327-30 (discussing how the political question doctrine could operate to
protect judicial selection procedures); see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying
text.
135. While it is beyond the scope of the current Article to explore standing
considerations under US law, the "case or controversy" requirement of the U.S.
Constitution may make it difficult for a challenge to be brought concerning
appointment of a federal judge. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 139 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018)
(finding lack of standing in a case on partisan gerrymandering); McClure v. Carter, 513
F. Supp. 265, 269, 271 (D. Idaho 1981) ("[W]e conclude that a United States Senator,
suing in either his individual capacity or his official capacity as a senator, lacks
standing to challenge the validity of the appointment of a federal judge," even with the
aid of a special jurisdictional statute); Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. Individual states have
identified their own standing requirements vis-A-vis challenges to judicial
appointments. See, e.g., Miller v. Carpeneti, No. 3:09-cv-00136-JWS, 2009 WL
10695976, at *8-9 (D. Ala. Sept. 15, 2009) (noting those who voted in judicial elections
may challenge an appointment under Alaskan state law if the state acts in an
arbitrary, capricious or invidious manner or distinguishes between citizens and voters).

136. See infra note 174 and accompanying text (noting a criminal defendant may
be better situated than a civil litigant to bring a challenge to a judicial appointment).
137. See United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 715 (2d Cir. 1962) (considering
questions relating to an interim appointment of a federal judge); American Convention,
supra note 11, at arts. 46-47 (regarding admissibility).
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Astrddsson, that actions concerning judicial appointments in the
United States have run afoul of the American Convention, not only
with respect to Article 8(1) (the right to a fair trial), but also perhaps
with respect to Article 24 (the right to equal protection), Article 25
(the right to judicial protection), and Article 29(c) (other rights
1 38
inherent in human personality or deriving from democratic norms).
Concerns also exist, as in Astrddsson, about potential violations of
national law, including various provisions of the U. S. Constitution as
well as Senate and Senate Judicial Committee rules affecting judicial
selection procedures, and about breaches of certain unwritten but
judicial
with
associated
norms
enforceable
potentially
39
appointments.1
Astrddsson also provides assistance on how the Commission
40
might distinguish between actionable and nonactionable matters.1
For example, Astrddsson suggests that only those violations of
national or international law that "are of a fundamental nature, and
form an integral part of the establishment and functioning of the
judicial system" can provide a basis for international intervention. 141
However, Astrddsson also underscores the need to observe judicial
appointment norms strictly in order to avoid undermining judicial
42
Behavior that
independence and public confidence in the judiciary.1
is deliberate or taken in manifest disregard of the controlling norms
may be of particular interest to the Commission.143

138. See American Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 8, 24-25, 29; see also Cova
Report, supra note 123.
139. See U.S. CONST., art II, §2, cl. 2 (concerning appointment of judges); U.S.
CONST. amend. I (concerning the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances); U.S. CONST. amends. V (concerning due process of law), VI (concerning
speedy and public trials in criminal matters), IX (concerning unenumerated rights
retained by the people), and XIV (concerning due process and equal protection);
Gudmundur Andri Astridsson v. Iceland, App. No. 26374/18, ¶¶ 55, 78, HUDOC
(2019); SENATE MANUAL, supra note 49; AKMAR, supra note 49, at ix; Senate Rules,
supra note 49; Clark, supra note 1, at 567-70 (describing unwritten norms regarding
judicial appointments utilized by the Senate since the adoption of the Constitution);
Trickey, supra note 2 (noting recent violations of unwritten norms in judicial
appointment procedures); Young, supra note 49, at 411-12 (arguing for unwritten
constitutional principles in the United States based on analogies to principles and
practices relating to England's unwritten constitution); see also supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text (citing relevant aspects of the U.S. Constitution).
140. See Astrddsson, 11 102, 123.
141. Id. ¶ 102.
142. See id. ¶¶ 42, 65, 99; see also Case E-21/16, Pascal Nobile v. DAS
Decision, EFTA Court, 1 16 (Feb. 14, 2017),
Rechtsschutz-Verscherungs,
Case
http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx-nvcases/21_16_Decision_of theCourt.pdf;
No. T-639/16 P, FV v. Council, T1 74-75 EU:T:2018:22, (Jan. 25, 2018).
143. See Astrd.dsson, ¶¶ 102, 123.
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Although the Commission cannot act sua sponte, as national
courts may in cases of this nature, 144 Astrddsson indicates that the
Commission can and should be quite rigorous in its investigation,
look[ing] behind appearances and ascertain[ing] whether a breach of the
applicable national rules on the appointment of judges created a real risk that
the other organs of Government, in particular the executive, exercised undue

discretion undermining the integrity of the appointment process to an extent
14 5
not envisaged by the national rules in force at the material time.

During the investigation, it would not be necessary for the
claimant to demonstrate unfairness in a particular proceeding, since
the injury is systemic in nature. 146 In fact, Astrddsson specifically

acknowledges that breaches of established norms relating to judicial
appointments act "to the detriment of the confidence that the
judiciary in a democratic society must inspire in the public and
contravene[] the very essence of the principle that a tribunal must be

established by law, one of the fundamental principles of the rule of
law." 14 7

VI.

MOVING FORWARD

Astrddsson shows that international law can play an important
role in both recognizing and redressing problems that arise internally
within a particular nation, even in areas as sensitive as judicial
appointments. Indeed, international law may be the only means of
addressing what David Landau has referred to as "abusive
constitutionalism," meaning the increasingly prevalent "use of
constitutional tools to create authoritarian and semi-authoritarian
regimes."14 8 In jurisdictions subject to this phenomenon,
[p]owerful incumbent presidents and parties can engineer constitutional
change so as to make themselves very difficult to dislodge and so as to defuse
institutions such as courts that are intended to check their exercises as power.
The resulting constitutions still look democratic from a distance and contain
many elements that are no different from those found in liberal democratic
constitutions. But from close up they have been substantially reworked to
149
undermine the democratic order.

144. See id. ¶ 69; see also FV v. Council, ¶ 66; supra note 99 (regarding actions in
domestic court).
145. Astrddsson, ¶ 103.
146. See id. ¶ 100.
147. Id. ¶ 123; see also id. 1 69; FV v. Council, ¶ 72.
148. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. .189, 191
(2013).
149. Id.

640

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL.53:615

While Landau and other commentators writing on this
phenomenon have focused primarily on jurisdictions other than the
United States, many of these types of behaviors have arguably
15 0
become part of the contemporary US legal and political scene.
Indeed, recent events regarding the appointment of federal judges
15 1
demonstrate the increasing urgency of reform relating in this field.
Given the disinclination of the U.S. Supreme Court to address
52
and the sharp
fundamental challenges to democracy in America1
53
the best-if not
rise in political divisiveness in the United States,1

only-chance for forward motion may come from outside the domestic
sphere.
This Article has focused on how one recent decision from the
ECtHR-Case
of Gudmundur Andri Astrddsson v. Iceland,
Application no. 26374/18-can help address concerns relating to the
154
Although the
appointment of federal judges in the United States.
case is not binding on US courts or the Commission, this is an area of
significant interest for the Commission. Indeed, in 2013, the
Commission issued an official guidance note indicating that it was
"troubled by the fact that some processes to select and appoint justice
operators [in the Americas] are not aimed at ensuring that the
candidates selected are the most meritorious and with the best
professional qualifications" but are instead "driven by political

considerations."1 5 5

Historically,

the

Commission

has

accepted

petitions relating to irregularities concerning judicial appointments,

150. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019) (ruling partisan
gerrymandering to be nonjusticiable); Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri, Courts Between
Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence From the Venezuelan Supreme
Court, 36 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 854, 859 (2011) (discussing lessons to be learned from
Venezuela); Landau, supra note 148, at 191 (focusing on Hungary, Colombia and
Venezuela); see also supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 139 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (finding lack of
standing in a case on partisan gerrymandering even though the Supreme Court was
arguably "the 'only institution in the United States' capable of 'solv[ing] this problem"');
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (2019) (ruling partisan gerrymandering to be nonjusticiable).
153. See Bruce Drake & Jocelyn Kelly, Americans Say the Nation's Political
Debate Has Grown More Toxic and "Heated"Rhetoric Could Lead to Violence, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. FACT TANK (July 28, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/07/18/americans-say-the-nations-political-debate-has-grown-more-toxic-andheated-rhetoric-could-lead-to-violence/ [httpsJ/perma.cc/Q8ND-4WLK] (archived Nov.
18, 2019).
154. See Astrddsson, 11 55, 78.
155. Guarantees for the Independence of Justice Operators: Towards
Strengthening Access to Justice and the Rule of Law in the Americas, INTER-AM.
¶ 77 (Dec. 5, 2013),
STATES
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM.
https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/defensores/docs/pdf/Justice-Operators-2013.pdf
[https:J/perma.cc/7LYR-9QLY] (archived Jan. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Guarantees for
Independence].
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which suggests it may be open to hearing a similar petition relating

to US judicial selection procedures.' 56
As a practical matter, an Astrddsson-style action proceeding
under the American Convention would need to be filed with the
Commission by a nongovernmental organization or an interested
individual or group of individuals.1 5 7 This is much more expansive
than the standard approach for standing to challenge a judicial
appointment in a US court.1 58 Furthermore, the action will likely

need to allege a "flagrant violation" of national law regarding the
appointment of one or more judges.1 59
Whether a successful action can be made out as a factual matter

remains to be seen, and it is not the goal of this Article to argue that
particular examples of recent Congressional behavior regarding
judicial appointments do or do not meet the standard described in
Astrddsson.160 However, even if this question is not currently ripe, it
may soon need to be asked given the problematic nature of the US
appointment process and the likely escalation of the issue in the
coming years as the US political culture deteriorates due to the
disruption of fundamental and longstanding norms involving political

give-and-take between political rivals who are nonetheless viewed as
inherently legitimate and
presidential excesses , and

the Congressional failure
violations of longstanding

to curb
political

norms. 16 1
In many ways, this phenomenon may be the result of the
increasingly popular view in the United States that the law does not
constitute a system of binding norms that operate in accordance with
the rule of law but is instead simply a tool (or indeed a weapon) to be
manipulated to achieve some substantive outcome.1 62 However,

156.

See Cova Report, supra note 123; Castaldi, supra note 123, at 488-89.

157.

See American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 44.

.

158. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
159. Astrddsson, 1T 100-01.
160. See supra notes 1-5, 13-19.
161. See Murray Tobias QC, Judicial Appointments in the United States and
Australia: A Comparison, 20 U. NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REv. 1, 6 (2018) (providing an
Australian perspective); Renan, supra note 66, at 2281 (noting that Article I and
Article III norms are currently under threat in the United States as a result of
"heightened [political] polarization and the 'fight to the finish' mentality that it
promotes, for example, in judicial appointments"). These types of actions threaten the
perception of judicial independence in a variety of ways. See Renan, supra note 66, at
2281.
162. See Brian Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule
of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 469, 470 (2007) (referring to the latter as an "instrumental"
view of law); see also Susan S. Silbey, The Dream of a Social Science: Supreme Court
Forecasting, Legal Culture, and the Public Sphere, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 785, 789 (2004)
(noting that an instrumental view of judicial appointments leads judges to be assessed
not for their craft, but as a result of their positions on certain issues and suggesting
that allowing judicial decisions to become understood only as "wins and losses ..
feed[s] the politicization and gaming of judicial appointments that have become ever
more systematic in an effort to predict, and control, the decisions of appointees").
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diminishing the respect for the law and the judiciary at the same
time that circumstances are increasing the role and importance of the
bench as a means of safeguarding constitutional checks and balances
63
appears to be a recipe for disaster.1
If reform cannot or will not come from within, then it perhaps
will have to come from without, via international law. For example, if
the Commission were to find for the applicant in an Astrddsson-style
petition regarding US judicial selection procedures, the merits report
issued by the Commission might provide the United States with
64
While the report
useful recommendations to remedy the situation.1
would not contain any mandatory obligations, it would perhaps
trigger an appropriate sense of urgency within the United States
about the severity of these concerns. This approach would be
consistent with that adopted by the ECtHR in Astrddsson.165
Although it is impossible to anticipate precisely what would be
contained in a merits report relating to US judicial selection
procedures, the Commission, along with the ECtHR and other
European bodies, has indicated support for merits-based appointment
procedures, which are believed to improve the quality and objectivity
66
of the judiciary while also reducing politicization of the process.1
This approach has been regularly discussed and debated within the
67
United States, so it is not entirely foreign to the US mindset.1
Of course, there is no mechanism within the American
Convention to force a country to comply with the recommendations
contained in a merits report, which means that the United States
might simply ignore the Commission. Indeed, the United States is
often characterized as somewhat hostile to the notion that it is
68
However, the fact
subject to international legal obligations.1

163. See Renan, supra note 66, at 2281.
164. See IACHR Statistics, supra note 116, (scroll down to glossary, look for
"Merits Report"); see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
165. See Gudmundur Andri Astradsson v. Iceland, App. No. 26374/18, 1 131,
HUDOC (2019). Although Astrddsson also included an award for damages, damages by
themselves are not enough to safeguard judicial appointment procedures. See id. at ¶¶
29, 35; see also supra note 27.
166. See Astrddsson, 1 71; Guidelines for a Transparent and Merit-Based System
for the Appointment of High-Level Judges, DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOUND. (2014),
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/guidelinesselectionof highleveljudges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KVK-XV2T] (archived Feb. 14, 2020); Recommendation, supra note
83, ¶ 44; Guaranteesfor Independence, supra note 155, at 101.
167. See Bell, supra note 85, at 301-03 (discussing merit selection in the federal
judicial appointment process); Fitzpatrick, supra note 85, at 675 (discussing merit
selection in state-level judicial appointment processes, often referred to as the
"Missouri Plan").
168.

See ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE

an anarchic
NEW WORLD ORDER 1 (2003) ("[T]he United States remains mired in ...
Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable."); Ashley Deeks,
Statutory International Law, 57 VA. J. INT'L L. 263, 265 (2018) ("Congress sees
international law as infringing on U.S. sovereignty, running contrary to U.S. national
interests, and challenging concepts of American exceptionalism."); Diane Desierto,
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remains that international legal obligations are enforceable against
state signatories of international treaties like the American
Convention.16 9 Although a Commission proceeding would likely be
the best first alternative for injured parties-not the least of which

because the likely result (a merits report) would not seek to impose a
particular solution on the United States for the problems currently

associated with judicial appointment procedures-states may adopt
other, more robust responses to violations of international law,
including the use of certain nonjudicial mechanisms known as
countermeasures.1 70
While a detailed discussion about countermeasures is beyond the
scope of the current analysis, it is enough for present purposes to note
that countermeasures involve various actions (other than force) that
are "unilateral in character, taken for a coercive purpose by a State
(the 'reacting State') in response to an internationally wrongful act

committed by the State against whom the countermeasures are
addressed
(the 'target State')
and which,
under normal
circumstances, would themselves be unlawful."171 Countermeasures
are only available to states (not individuals) and are only adopted
rarely, such as when a state experiences a direct injury as a result of
the violation of international law.17 2 One way that a state might
experience a direct injury as a result of the violation of international
legal principles involving the appointment of US judges would involve
the home state of an immigrant or refugee whose case was heard by a
judge who was improperly appointed.17 3 Because countermeasures

need not be reciprocal in nature (i.e., they need not relate to the
particular harm suffered, so long as the response is proportional),

Economic Nationalism in a New Age for International Economic Law: Recalling
Warnings of Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian School, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 30, 2017),
httpJ/www.ejiltalk.org/economic-nationalism -in-a-new-age-for-international-economiclaw-recalling-warnings-of-ludwig-von-mises-and-the-austrian- school/
[https://perma.cc/GU42-CM7Z] (archived Nov. 18, 2019) (arguing that the upsurge in
economic nationalism in the United States may be tied to sovereigntist resistance to
international law).
. 169. See Vienna Convention, supra note 102, at art. 18; Moore, supra note 102, at
600-01, 665-61.
170. See G.A. Res 56/83, annex, Responsibility of States for Intentionally
Wrongful Acts, at arts. 26, 49-54 (Dec. 12, 2001).
171. N. Jansen Calamita,
Countermeasures and Jurisdiction: Between
Effectiveness and Fragmentation, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 233, 242 (2011); see also id. at
242-44 (discussing authorities on countermeasures).
172. See Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, supra note 170,
at arts. 26, 49-54. Third states can also occasionally take countermeasures, although it
would be difficult to envision such an approach in the current case. See Christian
Hillgruber, The Right of Third States to Take Countermeasures, in THE FUNDAMENTAL
RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA

OMNES 265, 265 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006).
173. See S.I. Strong, Can International Law Trump Trump's Immigration
Agenda? Protecting Individual Rights Through ProceduralJus Cogens, 2019 U. ILL. L.
REv. 272, 272-73, 280-82 (2019).
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they could appropriately be invoked in situations involving improper
appointment of judges. 174
States' willingness to undertake countermeasures is often
affected by political considerations similar to those discussed
previously with respect to Commission actions, which suggests that
the United States is unlikely to be faced with this type of action, at
175
However, it is useful to know that
least in the foreseeable future.
international law provides several options for those seeking to
remedy the injuries caused by improper judicial appointments.
Perhaps, by outlining these various alternatives, the United States
will finally come to grips with the severity of the problems arising out
of current appointment mechanisms. Surely that is an outcome that
everyone in the United States can support, regardless of his or her
political affiliation.

174.
175.

See Calamita, supra note 171, at 242-44.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.

